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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Eleventh Amendment, Judicial Code, and Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure Restrict Ability of 
United States To Im.plead a State in Connection 
With Snit Commenced by a Private Citizen-
Parks v. United States* 
Suit was brought by an individual against the United States 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act1 to recover compensation for 
property damage alleged to have been caused by the Government's 
negligence in constructing and maintaining the physical components\ 
of a flood-control project in New York. Relying upon New York's 
promise to hold the United States harmless on any liability arising 
from damage of this nature, the Government impleaded the state. 
On a motion before the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of New York to dismiss the state as a third-party de-
fendant, held, motion granted. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
do not authorize service of a third-party complaint on a state, and 
the federal courts do not have jurisdiction to entertain such a com-
plaint filed by the United States; moreover, the eleventh amend-
ment to the federal constitution circumscribes an attempt by the 
Government to join a state as an involuntary third-party defendant 
when the principal action was commenced by a private citizen.2 
Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a 
defendant in a federal court to bring before the tribunal any "per-
son" subject to its jurisdiction who may be liable to the defendant 
for all or part of the amount which the plaintiff seeks to recover.8 
After he has been properly served with process, this newcomer is 
termed a third-party defendant, and in relation to him the defendant 
in the principal action is the third-party plaintiff.4 As a matter of 
• 241 F. Supp. 297 (N.D.N.Y. 1965). 
I. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964). 
2. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XI: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one 
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any 
Foreign State." See generally note 19 infra. 
3. Rule 14(a) provides in part: "At any time after commencement of the action a 
defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served 
upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part 
of the plaintiff's claim against him •••• " 
The United States, as a defendant in a suit under the Tort Claims Act, may implead 
a third party under rule 14(a). Schetter v. Housing Authority, 132 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. 
Pa. 1955); see Fong v. United States, 21 F.R.D. 385 (N.D. Cal. 1957); Skinner v. United 
States, 209 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Ill. 1960). , 
4. See IA BARRON &: HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACrICE &: PROCEDURE § 421 (Rules ed. 1960). 
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ordinary legal usage, however, the sovereign is not a "person."5 The 
court in the principal case believed that this usage was helpful in 
determining the applicability of rule 14(a) when an attempt is made 
to implead a state, especially in light of the fact that Congress had 
defined "person" in the canons of construction for the United States 
Code, to which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are appended, 
without suggesting that the word was meant to embrace states.6 
There is no indication in the canons themselves, however, that 
Congress intended the definition of any term therein to be exclu-
sive. 7 In fact, the United States Supreme Court, after examining the 
"legislative environment" of several Code provisions employing the 
word "person," has found states to be within the meaning of the 
term as used in those particular sections.8 Although rule 14(a) does 
not expressly provide that states can be impleaded, it does not even 
suggest that they cannot be, and its draftsmen do not appear to have 
felt that states should be immune from service of a third-party com-
plaint.9 Rule 14(a) is usually construed liberally, because an im-
pleader proceeding saves the time of courts and litigan_ts alike by 
functioning as an alternative to an independent suit by the defen-
dant in the principal action against a third party after the former 
has been found liable to the principal plaintiff.10 Indeed, the United 
States and various federal and state agencies have been successfully 
impleaded under rule 14(a),U and, as the court in the principal case 
recognized, third-party practice is just as useful whether the third 
party is a state, an individual, or other entity.12 
The court in the principal case also held that the language in 
section 1345 of title 28 of the Uni_ted States Code,13 which gives fed-
5. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 272 (1947). 
6. I U.S.C. § 1 (1964). 
7. Ibid. 
8. E.g., Sims v. United States, 359 U.S. 108 (1959) (states are "persons" within the 
meaning of !NT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 6332); Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 161 (1942) 
(states are "persons" as that term is used in § 7 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 210 (1890), 
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964)); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 370 (1934) (states 
are "persons" within the meaning of REv: STAT. § 3244 (1875)). See also United States v. 
California, 297 U.S. 175, 186 (1936), where the Court observed: "The presumption [that 
the sovereign is not bound unless named) is an aid to consistent construction of statutes 
when their purpose is in doubt, but it does not require that the aim of a statute fairly 
to be inferred be disregarded because not explicitly stated." · 
· 9. See FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a) (Notes of Advisory Committee). 
IO. See, e.g., Spring Hill Dairy v. Elswick, 20 F.R.D. 397 (E.D. Ky. 1957). 
11. See, e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951) (United States im• 
pleaded); Darby v. L. G. DeFelice &: Son, 94 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (Pennsylvania 
Turnpike Commission impleaded). In none of these cases did the court specifically 
deal with the meaning of the term "person" in rule 14(a). 
12. The principal case is the first to decide whether ·the United States may implead 
a state in connection with a suit initiated by a private party. United States v. Arizona, 
214 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1954), discussed but did not decide the question. 
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1964): "Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings 
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eral district courts jurisdiction over "all civil actions, suits or pro-
ceedings when commenced by the United States," did not confer 
jurisdiction over the Government's third-party claim against a state 
because the principal action to which the third-party claim would 
have been ancillary had been commenced by a private party and 
not by the United States. However, the Government, as the third-
party plaintiff, had commenced the impleader action, and "pro-
ceeding," the crucial word in section 1345, has been defined broadly 
enough to include the adjudication of a third-party claim.14 More-
over, the court's interpretation does violence to the statutory scheme 
of which section 1345 is an integral part. By acceding to the federal 
constitution, the states have "agreed" to be sued by the United 
States.15 Prior to the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, however, 
only the United States Supreme Court had jurisdiction over such ac-
tions.16 To allow federal district courts to entertain Government suits 
against the states, Congress in 1948 enacted section 1345 along with 
section 1251(b)(2) of title 28. The latter provision vests the Supreme 
Court with "original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all contro-
versies between the United States and a State."17 The Reviser's Note 
to section 1251 and at least one appellate court opinion indicate that 
the effect of sections 1251(b)(2) and 1345 taken together is to elimi-
nate the need for any further congressional action to confer upon 
the district courts jurisdiction to hear any type of judicial controversy 
between the federal government and a state.18 It appears, therefore, 
that the word "commence" in section 1345 is unnecessary to give 
effect to t~e _purpose of the provision insofar as the enactment confers 
jurisdiction over litigation between the United States and a state. 
Possibly believing that its interpretations of rule 14(a) and section 
1345 were overly restrictive, the court dismissed the Government's 
third-party complaint only after giving extensive consideration to 
the eleventh amendment, which protects a state's sovereign right 
not to be made an involuntary defendant to a claim asserted by a 
private individual by providing that no federal court has juris-
diction to entertain an action by a private citizen against a state 
which has not consented to be sued.19 While the court was unques-
commenced by the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly author-
ized to sue by Act of Congress." 
14. See Statter v. United States, 66 F.2d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 1933). 
15. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 644-46 (1892). 
16. See United States v. California, 328 F.2d 729 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 817 
(1964). 
17. See generally United States v. California, supra note 16. 
18. Id. at 737; see Wagner, The Original an~ Exclusive Jurisdiction of the United 
States Supreme Court, 2 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 111, 142 (1952); 38 N.Y.U.L. REV, 405, 410 
(1963). 
19. After the Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction of a suit against a state by a 
citizen of another state in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), the anxiety 
manifested by the several states was so strong that at the first session of Congress sub-
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tionably correct in stating that rule 14(a) cannot be employed in a 
manner which would infringe a third party's substantive rights20-
let alone in a way which would override the United. States Consti-
tution-it was mistaken in concluding that the eleventh amendment 
or the policy behind its adoption serves to immunize a state from a 
third-party proceeding initiated by the United States simply because 
the federal government was the defendant in the principal action 
initiated by a private citizen. 
The United States may sue a state irrespective of the latter's 
consent.21 Indeed, the court in the principal case recognized that if 
the plaintiff obtained a judgment against the United States, the 
Government would be able to recover from New York by bringing 
a later, independent action in a federal court.22 Therefore, to have 
considered the application of rule 14(a) to New York as an infringe-
ment of the state's substantive rights, the court must have believed 
that, if the third-party complaint were not dismissed, the plaintiff 
in the principal action would have received some advantage incon-
sistent with the state's prerogative not to be sued by him. However, 
the test for determining whether a third party may be brought into 
court under rule 14(a) is not whether the plaintiff in the principal 
action appears to have a claim against him, but rather whether the 
principal defendant may have a right of recovery from him-by 
way of indemnity, contribution, or otherwise-for any part of the 
principal plaintiff's claim for which the principal defendant is found 
liable.23 Furthermore, a third-party defendant's joining the litiga-
tion creates no rights against him in favor of the plairitiff.24 Conse-
sequent to the Court action the eleventh amendment was proposed. See U.S. LEGISLA-
TIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1046-47 
(1964). Although the amendment does not expressly prohibit a suit in a federal court 
by a private citizen against his own state, the Court has so construed it. Hans v. 
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
20. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
21. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892). 
22. See United States v. Arizona, 214 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1954), suggesting by way of 
dictum that the United States may assert a right of recovery over against a state in a 
federal district court. See also United States v. California, 328 F.2d 729 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 379 U.S. 817 (1964), holding that federal district courts have jurisdiction to 
entertain suits commenced by the United States against a state, regardless of the sub-
ject of the controversy. 
23. IA BARRON & HoLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 4, § 426, at 681-82; 3 MOORE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE 1J 14.10 (2d ed. 1964). 
24. Davies v. Dotson, 198 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (third-party action in a 
federal court adjudicates the rights of the third-party plaintiff and the third-party de-
fendant inter sese). The plaintiff in the principal action, however, is free to amend his 
complaint to state a claim against the third-party defendant once the latter has been 
brought into court. FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a). Nevertheless, with almost complete unanimity 
· courts have held that the controversy initiated by such an amendment can be main-
tained only if it could have been the basis for an independent suit between the 
principal plaintiff and the third-party defendant in the same court. 3 MooRE, FEDERAL 
PRACIICE -J 14.27, at 721 (2d ed. 1964). 
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quently, a judgment against the third-party defendant on the third-
party complaint inures solely to the benefit of the defendant in the 
principal action.25 The principal case apparently represents the 
first attempt by a defendant against whom sovereign immunity from 
involuntary suit was no defense to implead a state when the plaintiff 
in the principal action could not have sued the state. However, there 
are decisions which have held that the United States may be im-
pleaded by a defendant on whose behalf the Government had waived 
its immunity, despite the fact that it had not waived its immunity 
for ·the benefit of the plaintiff in the principal action.26 These cases 
suggest that, when an attempt is made to bring a sovereign entity 
25. Davies v. Dotson, 198 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Chevassus v. Harley, 8 F,R.D. 
410 (W.D. Pa. 1948); IA BARRON & HoLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 4, at 681; see note 24 
supra. 
26. A federal employee injured in the course of his employment can demand com• 
pensation from the Government only under the Federal Employees Compensation Act 
§ 751a, 63 Stat. 861 (1949), 5 U.S.C. § 751 (1964). It is generally said that the United 
States has waived its immunity to suit to the extent that the employee is permitted to 
recover under the act. See Drake v. Treadwell, 299 F.2d 789 (3d Cir.), vacated ,b re• 
manded per curiam, 322 U.S. 772 (1963). Occasionally a federal employee injured in the 
course of his employment because of the concurrent negligence of the United States 
and some third party has sued the third party in tort. Generally, a defendant who is 
a joint tortfeasor with the Government has a right to contribution from the United 
States and can enforce it by impleading the Government under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951). However, since the injured 
employee who had commenced the tort suit against the private joint tortfeasor could 
not have sued the United States in a tort action, the question has arisen whether this 
defendant is still free to implead the Government in connection with the employee's 
suit, so as to enforce the defendant's right of contribution. It has generally been held 
that impleader is permissible. Drake v. Treadwell, C.A. No. 14517, W.D, Pa., orders of 
May 24, 1963, and July 7, 1963, on remand from 372 U.S. 772 (1963); Hart v. Simons, 
223 F. Supp. 109 (E.D. Pa. 1963). But see Busey v. Washington, 225 F. Supp. 416 (D,D,C. 
1964). See Martin v. United States, 162 F. Supp. 441 (E.D. Pa. 1958), suggesting in dlc• 
tum that a municipality's immunity from suit for the negligence of its agents which 
would bar plaintiff's claim against the municipality might not prevent the United 
States from impleading the municipality. See al~ Schetter v. Housing Authority, 132 
F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Pa. 1955). 
The holding in the principal case not only denied the United States the privilege 
of initiating an impleader proceeding but also would force the Government to relitigate 
the question of its liability to the plaintiff in the principal action in any subsequent 
suit brought by the United States against New York to recover the amount of a judg-
ment obtained against the Government by the principal plaintiff. Generally, an in-
demnitor, such as New York, who was given notice of a claim against his indemnitee 
of the type to which his indemnity agreement refers and an opportunity to join the 
defense of that claim is bound by a finding establishing the indemnitec's liability to the 
claimant. Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316 (1896); New 
York & Porto Rico S.S. Co. v. Lee's Lighters, Inc., 48 F.2d 372 (E.D.N.Y. 1930); REsTATE• 
MENT, JUDGMENTS § 107 (1942). However, an attempt by the United States to bind New 
York by a judgment adverse to the Government, rendered after the dismissal of the 
state as a third-party defendant, would be met by an objection similar to that which 
the court in the principal case considered determinative of the impleader issue, since 
the attempt would have arisen from an effort to force the state to appear in the same 
proceedings with the plaintiff in the principal action and to assist the Government in 
defeating the principal plaintiff's claim. See 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 1506, 1509 (1965). 
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into court as a third-party defendant, no attention need be given to 
the question whether the principal plaintiff can sue the sovereign. 
Actually, the court in the principal case did recognize that if 
New York were impleaded it would not be subjected to suit by a 
private citizen, but felt that in effect the state would be engaged in 
the proceedings as though it were being sued by the principal plain-
tiff-an impermissible situation absent state legislation indicating a 
waiver of immunity. As long as no judgment is sought against it, 
however, the mere fact that a state is involved in a judicial pro-
ceeding and is forced to litigate against a private citizen to protect 
its interests does not indicate that the· state is being sued within the 
meaning of the eleventh amendment.27 Furthermore, rather than 
having demanded, as a prerequisite to allowing the state to be im-
pleaded, evidence that New York had waived its immunity from suit 
by a private party, the court could simply have held that New York's 
"consent" to suit by the United States, expressed by the state's ac-
ceding to the federal constitution, was broad enough to include 
consent to become a party to a proceeding commenced by impleader 
by the United States.28 
Suits by the federal government against the states must inevitably 
increase in number as both the national and state governments ex-
pand their activities.29 By giving undue respect to the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, the principal case presents an unnecessary im-
pediment to the efficient adjudication of these disputes. 
27. See Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1947). 
28. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. An additional ground for saying that 
New York impliedly waived its sovereign immunity could be found in its promise to 
hold the United States harmless on its liability for damage of the type which occurred 
in the principal case. Because such indemnity agreements often lead to third-party pro-
ceedings, it would seem logical to hold that New York had consented to involvement 
in such proceedings. See 65 CoLuM. L. REv. 1509 (1965). 
29. See United States v. California, 328 F.2d 729 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 817 
(1964). 
